Is Ahlu-Sunna A Terror Organization?

Since October 1st, Ahlu-Sunna-Wa-Jama’a (ASWJ) Militia, an extremist politico-religious group disbanded early last year, took over the town of Gurie-El and the surrounding region in Galmudug. ASWJ leaders arrived a month ago in the region to seemingly join a religious gathering after a year and a half of exile abroad. Galmudug state forces assisted by Federal security forces are now battling with the militia for the fourth straight day in Guri-El. Reports indicates there are up to 120 casualties and other wounded treated in the nearby towns.

In light of recent events, people are wondering if it is worth shedding blood instead of finding more peaceful ways out of the crisis. ASWJ had been in the political landscape for over two decades and presented itself as an anti-Al-Shabab force or is it? However, some see the group as another “terrorist group” vying to divide the nation. In the next lines, we will try to revisit the ASWJ and compare it with Al-Shabab.

First of all, it is quite distracting to call ASWJ a terrorist organization because such a designation will not affect the issue at hand. Also, on the Somali political spectrum, allegiance is based more on clan affiliation than an ideology or a particular cause. Generally speaking, few agrees on the definition of who qualifies for this label anyway. Basically, every country has its idea of a terrorist group. It could be a group with an extreme worldview, a violent group, any rebel group, or just a religious group like the Muslim Brotherhood with no connection to violence or extremism.

In the Somali context, we could designate a terrorist group any rebel militia that wage a war against the legitimate government, indiscriminately kills civilians, feeds young people an extremist ideology to commit violence and claims to be a total system. Sadly, history is replete with such groups and individuals who ended up trading their fatigues for a costume and earning the respect of those who have called them terrorists. In Somalia, one can only point out Presidents Ahmed Madobe of Jubaland and President Musa Bihi of Somaliland as the perfect example of such transformation.

If we compare ASWJ to Al-Shabab, they have both an extreme religious ideology that seek to triumph over any other doctrines, they have structures, diehard militants, armed militias, control territories and businesses. They both want to govern Somalia and are both on opposing extremes.

Their difference lies in their modus operandi and their history. Sufism was part of the Somali cultural fabric and was tolerant. The advance of modern education and the Salafist ideology blowing from Saudi Arabia made it moribund until 1991. Comrade Mohamed Siad Barre preferred the traditional Sufi cleric to the dogmatic Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabis which he violently repressed.

In the chaos following the Civil War and the collapse of the state, some Somalis fighters who came back from Afghanistan, after the defeat of the Soviet Union, found an opportunity to obliterate the remains of the Sufism in Somalia and started destroying revered mausoleums. ASWJ is born out of this reaction to these extremists. It was initially to protect ancestral way of life whether we like it or not that way of life.

General Mohamed Farah Aydid who hailed from the region where they operated didn’t see them as a threat to his authoritarian rule in the region. After September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Afghanistan, Americans were alerted that fleeing Al-Qaida leaders were using the lawlessness in Somalia to set up base. They were told that ASWJ was the sworn enemy of groups linked to Al-Qaida. With the rise of the Islamic Courts, they didn’t hesitate to train, equip and fund the group. After Ethiopia invaded Somalia, the group continued to collaborate with the Ethiopian army and even served as auxiliary troops.

ASWJ took Sufism to a more ideological and dogmatic level unknown to Somalis until now – we will not go into religious details. They established their own state within the state, similar to the Lebanese Hezbollah. They have their army and politicians. They agree to collaborate with the Somali government as long as they are part of the decision-making and, if they are not satisfied with the political arrangement, they don’t hesitate to turn, usually violently, against the state, to obtain better terms. Until now, it has been difficult to accommodate their list of demands sometimes at odds with the way a modern state functions.

Like all groups that claim to be Sufis, ASWJ cultivates the cult of personality around a spiritual leader, Moalim Mohamud, respect for his family whose son, Abdisamad Moalim Mohamud, also revered, will eventually succeed him, and a political leader, here the Sheikh Mohamed Shakir Ali.

On the other hand Al-Shabab was initially part of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) but once their plans of an Islamic state were frustrated by the American intervention and Ethiopian invasion, they resorted to a guerilla tactics against the occupiers. With their leaders either killed, jailed, expelled or now part of the government, their ideology hardened and their all-out war against the Ethiopian occupation morphed into a struggle against any individual who they suspect of being close to this government of collaborators.

With their allegiance to Al-Qaida, they become estranged from the local religious culture, having no care about human life. They also developed a shadow sophisticated state system operating from the shadows and kill those who stand in their way. Al-Shabab’s ideology is similar to that prevailing in armed groups indoctrinated by Wahhabism. It presents itself as an internationalist group and as such does not consider affiliation to a nation or a clan. For them, there is no border, no difference between ethnic groups and being from the Al-Qaida network, they enlist foreign fighters in their ranks in Somalia.

ASWJ is as much lethal and no less dangerous for the future of an established viable government. Their mix of clan-affiliation, religion, politics and weaponizing their followers make them very dangerous. Some ASWJ leaders toughened their voices and made comments worthy of groups such as Al-Qaida and Daesh. Sheikh Shakir, the group’s political wing chief, encouraged his militants fighting government security forces to die as martyrs defending their religion. This after other clerics of the same movement in Mogadishu cited fatwas on October 22 qualifying the operations in Galmudug as a war against the principles of religion.

2) Their deceitful flexibility in laying down their weapons when they see fit or have no other options and resorting to violence at the first turn make them untrustworthy.

To make matters worse, current ASWJ is no more the ragtag militia protecting their way of life against imported violent ideology but they grew into a formidable mercenary army ready to sell its service to the highest bidder and shed their own people’s blood. ASWJ trained and armed by the Ethiopian TPLF, with funding from the American CIA, carried out more attacks against Somalia’s security forces than against Al-Shabab fighters. They have also been implicated in abuses against civilians suspected of supporting or sympathizing with Al-Shabab. Their reappearance on September came at a time when Somalia was awaiting the ICJ’s verdict on Kenya’s maritime claim and elements within Somalia (i.e. Puntland which previously defended ASWJ) resent Ahmed Karie Qoor-Qoor, the Galmudug president, for supporting the outgoing Somalia’s President.

All in all, both of these organizations use ideologically radicalized youth and armed militias to conserve their territory, levy taxes and advance their own political agendas. They come from two opposite extremes. Whether it’s a clan-based organization revolving around personality cult or a decentralized internationalist shadow structure, the end game is the same, their method of forcing Somalis to comply with a parallel set of laws is the same.

As long as we clearly identify as not working for the government and mid our business, we could survive in either in these groups territories. However, from the government perspective, their ideologies, militias and antigovernment activities are deadly and have to be defeated at all costs After many years without a properly functioning government capable of protecting its citizens, it’s hard to understand government security operations that can result in preventable deaths and displacements. But, did we ask ourselves, what is the alternative if a negotiation with ideologically violent and uncompromising groups is not possible?

Omar Salad

Omar is an IT specialist based in Mogadishu.