The Fragile Foundations of Somali Federalism
The ongoing election talks have demonstrated that Somalia still has a long way to go to extricate itself from the consequences of the state collapse and ensuing civil war. Indeed, although Somalia transitioned out of “failed state” status in 2009 and ended its transitional government period in 2012, the federal model—still embedded within an unfinished constitution—remains poorly understood and continues to fuel friction between regional administrations and the federal government.
Post-civil war Somalia remains a work in progress, as decades of conflict dismantled nearly all state institutions. While the country’s pre-1969 democracy operated under a highly centralized model, the current federal system—forged through numerous post-war conferences—requires a delicate balance of power between Mogadishu and the regional states. Consequently, the road to consensus will be long and tortuous. Merely negotiating electoral logistics, venue arrangements, or yielding to a polarized political climate and undue pressure from Western representatives will not resolve these underlying structural challenges.
As a parliamentary democracy, Somalia’s governance ultimately rests with its Members of Parliament and Senators. A comprehensive national debate on the foundations of federalism and the clear distribution of powers is essential to eliminate jurisdictional disputes. Equally critical is the establishment of a constitutional court to arbitrate conflicts between regional and central authorities.
The Core Dispute: Regional Autonomy vs. Central Authority
The current political standoff, ostensibly centered on the electoral process, has laid bare the root of the crisis: the stonewalling by Puntland and Jubaland leaders. These regional administrations oppose the federal government’s efforts to permanently alter the status quo inherited from the previous administration.
The arrangement that dissenting leaders—namely Said Deni and Ahmed Islam “Madobe”—seek to preserve grants regions near-total autonomy in economic, financial, military, and foreign policy matters. Under this model, regional administrations operate with minimal oversight or input from Mogadishu. Unlike his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” has rejected this decentralized interpretation of federalism. His administration has actively pursued state-unifying initiatives, drawing sharp criticism from Puntland, Jubaland, and Somaliland.
Countering Foreign Influence and Asserting Sovereignty
For instance, the Farmajo administration has moved to curb the United Arab Emirates’ stranglehold on Somalia’s security sector, dismantling the UAE’s special ties with regional states and its meddling in national politics. Mogadishu has expelled Emirati military instructors, clamped down on illicit financial flows from the UAE, and continues to assert greater sovereignty over foreign security partnerships.
The government has adopted a similarly firm stance toward Kenya, culminating in the severing of diplomatic ties in November 2020. The dispute extends beyond maritime boundaries in the Indian Ocean; Kenya maintains troops in southern Somalia, effectively providing security cover for Jubaland’s leader, Ahmed Madobe. Domestically, President Farmajo has expanded the national army to prepare for the post-AMISOM security transition, while simultaneously forging a new regional military alignment with Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The Electoral Standoff and External Interference
On the domestic front, the federal government has reasserted control over airspace previously managed by Somaliland and enacted legislation regulating regional leadership elections. These measures have been used to shape favorable political outcomes, notably blocking figures like former Al-Shabaab commander Mukhtar Robow from winning the 2018 South West state election. In response, the Jubaland leader defied federal directives, enacting his own electoral laws under the protection of Kenyan forces and thereby shielding himself from potential federal intervention.
With federal authority expanding, Puntland’s President Said Deni has grown increasingly anxious—both over his ongoing ties with the UAE and regarding his own political future. After successfully lobbying Mogadishu and Parliament in September 2020 to revert to an indirect electoral model (a rollback of the previously ratified direct elections), Deni reportedly calculated that he could leverage this compromise to eventually unseat President Farmajo. Deni and Madobe subsequently engineered delays that pushed elections past Farmajo’s constitutional mandate expiration on February 7, later advancing arguments to delegitimize his continued tenure. Nevertheless, Farmajo has signaled his intention to run for re-election and refuses to capitulate to the demands of the two regional leaders and their allies within the “Union of Presidential Candidates.”
It is an open secret that these opposition figures enjoy backing from foreign actors, notably Kenya and the UAE, both of which have grown increasingly hostile toward Farmajo’s administration. Furthermore, certain international community representatives based in Mogadishu have been criticized for effectively paralyzing the post-mandate government, limiting its actions to endless negotiations with recalcitrant regional leaders.
Pathways Forward: Breaking the Deadlock
The government’s announcement on April 7 regarding the collapse of election talks underscores its frustration with regional intransigence, as well as mounting public pressure from a population exhausted by fruitless negotiations. If Puntland and Jubaland continue to refuse honoring the indirect election model they initially championed, signed, and lobbied Parliament to ratify, the federal government retains several viable options.
First, it could petition Parliament to abrogate the September 17 agreement and revert to the direct election model previously debated and approved by the legislature. Second, it could proceed with the elections in compliant regions—Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South West, and Benadir—that have adhered to the spirit of the indirect electoral framework, despite its vulnerabilities to corruption and vote-buying. The government’s April 9 letter to the UN Security Council signaled its commitment to the spirit of the September 17, 2020 agreement and the February 15–16 Baidoa Technical Committee recommendations. Crucially, it also affirmed Mogadishu’s resolve to advance the electoral process with or without Puntland and Jubaland.
Conclusion: A Maturing Democracy
The coming days will be decisive for Somalia’s trajectory, shaping whether the country can build a democratic system that reflects popular aspirations, strengthens national unity, and restores public confidence in state institutions. As a parliamentary democracy, Somalia’s political direction ultimately rests with its legislature. It is important to recognize that, in principle, intergovernmental election negotiations are not an absolute prerequisite for holding federal elections.
Somalia has matured significantly since the civil war. The era of unruly regions, unchecked political corruption, pervasive insecurity, and a disillusioned populace is gradually fading, paving the way for a more cohesive and resilient state.
